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prevention-the case of strokes" is an
optimistic view of the development of
hypotensive agents. Most surprisingly, the
contraceptive pill is not included as a
"definitive moment", though it has perhaps
done more for human welfare and
happiness than any other discovery of the
century. Some small errors in chemistry do
not spoil any of the excitement of these
stories.
The rise ended with the dearth of new
drugs and the failings oftechnology. The
fall came, according to Le Fanu, with two
kinds of research, genetics and
epidemiology, which have not justified the
enormous effort put into them. He suggests
that the introduction of genes into novel
environments, the understanding of the
genetic disorder in hereditary diseases, and
attempts to transplant genes have
contributed very limitedly to human benefit,
and he argues that these activities could not
be expected to contribute much. Likewise he
is highly critical of opinions that an
unhealthy lifestyle or faulty diets have much
to do with heart disease and cancer.
Committed advocates will no doubt
disagree with his judgements, but what he
writes deserves serious thought. Not only
medical literature but public opinion has
become riddled with correlations sloppily
regarded as causes without a shred of
supporting analysis.
Le Fanu recognizes four paradoxes,
which he neatly labels "Disillusioned
doctors", "The Worried Well", "The
Soaring Popularity of Alternative Medicine"
and "The Spiralling Costs of Health Care",
all of which are indeed ofmuch concern
today. He inclines to the view that medicine
will continue to develop its technical skills
and augment the problems which already
exist, and that these scenarios will get
worse. What ought to happen, he suggests,
is an independent inquiry powerful enough
to slay his two rampant dragons, the
"intellectual falsehoods of The Social
Theory" and the "intellectual pretensions of
The New Genetics". Also, the ideology of
progress should be laid low, the public and
the profession disabused of the idea that all
progress is good, and medicine should be
relocated "within that tradition so
eloquently evoked by Sir William Osler". It
would be interesting to bring Osler to life
and see how he handled today's medical
resources.
Surely this is far too simple a solution,
although anything which leads to more
respect for patients by doctors is welcome.
The "rise of medicine" did much to
dehumanize medical practice, to see patients
as bits of physiological machinery brought
in for investigation, or raw material for the
display of surgical brilliance. But that
amorphous entity "the public" has always
welcomed every talk of a new cure, and the
media leap at every chance to please its
hopes, and also rouse its fears. Le Fanu
wisely expects all the pressures from outside
medicine to go on or increase. How
depressing! Is there no remedy for the
consequences of progress?
Miles Weatherall,
Charlbury, Oxon
Robert A Aronowitz, Making sense of
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Cambridge History of Medicine series,
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The title may appear to be somewhat
of a misnomer, Aronowitz being
concerned less with the patient's own
response to an illness, or to an illness's
diagnosis, than with the disease's
nosological status within the doctor's
system of classification: with professional
conflicts over the style of medical practice,
its specialization and the role of new
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technologies, and the status of clinical
observations and epidemiological data in a
particular era. As a clinician, and starting
from his own practical dilemmas, he
considers the development of controversial
"new" diseases: controversial because of
the suggestion of social factors in their
etiology, a finding which biomedicine
alone cannot easily handle.
He considers certain instances where the
fit between the patient's illness and the
doctor's disease is poor-sicknesses which
fail to satisfy an earlier biomedical
assumption of one gene, one protein, one
disease. The book opens with myalgic
encephalomyelitis ("post-viral fatigue
syndrome"), which in its modem form
appeared in 1934 in Los Angeles as
"atypical poliomyelitis" causing few deaths
and little paralysis, and which occurred
among health workers in an environment of
strict isolation ofputative cases; compare
the Royal Free Epidemic of 1955 in
London. Aronowitz pays some attention to
the role of public opinion and self-help
groups in promoting the popularity of the
disease but not the fuller type of
anthropological analysis: new notions of
"fatigue" or "virus", or indeed of the
general nature of self-help groups as cults of
affliction which Janzen has aptly termed
"Drums Anonymous".
In the 1950s, the psychoanalytically
orientated idea of "psychosomatic disease"
such as ulcerative colitis, with its particular
personality type and style ofpsychological
defences, was replaced by the more modest
(but more biomedical) "physical disease
affected by psychological factors" as the
third revision of the Diagnostic and
statistical manual put it: a new paradigm
influenced by the efficacy of steroid
treatment, the then current idea of auto-
immune disease, and the problem of
etiology where one had multifactorial
causation. In the 1970s, an epidemic in
Lyme, Connecticut, led to the crystallization
of Lyme Disease out of the earlier and
symptomatic erythema chronicum migrans,
an episode considered a significant advance
by clinical and epidemiological pathology
by analogy with the particularization of
syphilic lesions out of a number ofearlier
inchoate symptoms. Lyme Disease,
attributed to a tick-born spirochaete, led to
a public panic: to environmental campaigns
to defoliate American suburbia, pre-
symptomatic antibiotic treatment, general
health campaigns and the screening of
donated blood.
Similarly, the author shows how the
new biomedical entity of coronary heart
disease crystallized out of the earlier and
only symptomatic angina pectoralis, the
physiological emphasis on the coronary
arteries now facilitating the emergence of
the new clinical speciality of cardiology.
Symptomatic heart distress was relegated
to "effort syndrome" or "neurocirculatory
asthenia". The more discrete CHD was
then associated with an upper-middle-class
and white population, but has more
recently been associated with its opposite.
The idea of "risk factors" in CHD,
associated with the Framingham study, has
been criticized as a list of ingredients rather
than a recipe, as too individualistic and
ignoring milieu and interaction. Risk factors
became treatable conditions themselves. The
book all too briefly considers the idea of
risk as a new social idiom, and takes the
rise and fall of Type A personality
(excessive conscientiousness and time
urgency) as an example of relatively
marginal doctors proposing a new
mechanism (whose name would not offend
potential psychologist referees concerned
about the invasion of their turf) and which
temporarily proved popular because of its
links to the then fashionable cholesterol
hypothesis and its vague fit with counter-
cultural aspirations.
Aronowitz ignores Helman's well-known
and excellent paper on Type A and notions
of time, to trace the decline ofType A
theories to purely biomedical findings
(social change being perhaps more
significant). The book is likely to appeal
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more to historians of particular conditions
and to physicians concerned with their own
procedures ofclassification and practice
than to medical social scientists. Little
broader scope but an interesting
practitioner's perspective.
Roland Littlewood,
University College London
Henry Harris, The birth ofthe cell, New
Haven and London, Yale University Press,
1999 pp. xii, 212, illus., £20.00 (0-300-
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Harris offers a solid description of
microscopic anatomy chiefly for the
nineteenth century, with forays especially
before. Readers will quickly discover
Harris's passion for the topic, its workers,
and the art of observing things
microscopic. The author is a highly
experienced microscopist who here is
tracing the historical origins of his
practice in search of the process of
assembly: how did evidence for cell theory
come to be collected? Who was
responsible for discovering what? Harris's
goal is to look past "many standard
accounts ... in particular the perfunctory
versions given in general textbooks" (p. xi)
and describe a far more complex network
of research in which internal tensions and
competing projects are brought to the
foreground. Who really discovered the cell
doctrine, and what else was discovered in
the process?
Harris deserves much praise. The
examined range of primary published
sources is impressive. So too is the
provision of quotes, with English
translations accompanied by an appendix
of original language texts. Harris's
coverage is broadly European, and his
awareness of intra-European rivalries
makes him sensitive to looking past
favouritism grounded in nationalism. This
sensitivity brings Harris to offer valuable
descriptions of early nineteenth-century
French research, including that by Henri
Dutrochet and Francois Raspail, in an
effort to prove not everything new came
from a small set of German hands.
Others, too, are saved from similar
"historiographical injustices" (p. 64) as
Harris builds a diverse and talented
community around-plus a populous
intellectual parentage for-well-known cell
theorists such as Matthias Schleiden,
Theodor Schwann, and Rudolf Virchow.
They certainly were not alone. This book
provides superb coverage of relevant
researchers and texts. Harris's expertise
with the craft of microscopy combines
with his scholarly eye for detail in the
literature. This is a work of immense
patience and care. As epilogue, short
chapters also consider late nineteenth-
century investigations of chromosomes and
determinants of heredity.
Yet, historians will be disappointed.
Harris forces his historical actors to see
through his eyes and not their own. This
presentism is explicit (pp. 24-5) and
defended on realist grounds-Harris is too
experienced a microscopist to let nature
count for nothing in the construction of
facts. But here he goes too far. By
reducing research to a primitive form of
discovery (where either we see it properly
or we don't), Harris fails to value the
distinction between seeing and seeing as.
The complex interpretative matrix filtering
observation as each microscopist peered
through their lenses goes unexamined.
How can cell thinking be sensitively
described while complex debates about the
origin of life and the nature of animation
are excluded? Nature underdetermines
understanding. Whether they include
natural theology, animalicular theory,
Naturphilosophie, or harsh materialism,
these matrices shape the ways researchers
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